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The relationship between vivid visual mental images and unexpected recall (incidental
recall ) was replicated, refined, and extended. In Experiment 1, participants were asked
to generate mental images from imagery-evoking verbal cues (controlled on several verbal
properties) and then, on a trial-by-trial basis, rate the vividness of their images; 30 min later,
participants were surprised with a task requiring free recall of the cues. Higher vividness rat-
ings predicted better incidental recall of the cues than individual differences (whose effect
was modest). Distributional analysis of image latencies through ex-Gaussian modeling
showed an inverse relation between vividness and latency. However, recall was unrelated
to image latency. The follow-up Experiment 2 showed that the processes underlying trial-
by-trial vividness ratings are unrelated to the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
(VVIQ), as further supported by a meta-analysis of a randomly selected sample of relevant
literature. The present findings suggest that vividness may act as an index of availability
of long-term sensory traces, playing a non-epiphenomenal role in facilitating the access of
those memories.
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INTRODUCTION
People often report they experience vivid spontaneous visual men-
tal images in situations in which they have to recall something they
did not expect to recall (incidental recall). Early imagery studies
revealed that the spontaneous and involuntary appearance of a
vivid visual mental image consistently occurred in response to cer-
tain memory conditions and tasks involving incidental recall. For
example, upon asking subjects to remember the type of breakfast
one had in the morning (Galton, 1880), the number of windows
in one’s house (Shepard, 1966) or to verify a property of an expe-
rienced event with no aid of a current percept (Goldenberg et al.,
1992) individuals often report vivid images. In such context, vivid-
ness is traditionally defined as a construct expressing the self-rated
degree of richness, amount of detail (resolution), and clarity of
a mental image, as compared to the experience of actual seeing
(D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2007). Although vividness correlates with
performance on certain memory tasks (Baddeley and Andrade,
2000), with arousal level (Barrowcliff et al., 2004; Bywaters et al.,
2004), with positive emotional valence toward a stimulus (Alter
and Balcetis, 2010), and with increased visual cortex activity (Farah
and Peronnet, 1989; Farah et al., 1989; Sparing et al., 2002; Cui
et al., 2007; Cattaneo et al., 2011, 2012), any attempt to clarify its
function and its relationship to underlying processes still presents
numerous challenges.
Manipulating vividness directly is difficult, and the lack of
converging analyses has generally led to the use of correlational
approaches that examine vividness predominantly as an index of
individual differences in the ability to generate mental images.
Furthermore, many preceding studies either confounded vividness
with other variables, or did not appropriately interpret the valid-
ity criteria by anchoring the vividness construct to models of
memory and verbal report underlying processes. This is a situ-
ation analogous to the one denounced years ago by Ericsson and
Simon (1980) in the context of models of verbal reports, instru-
ments such as vividness ratings/scale/questionnaires seem to be
used in a brute empirical fashion, without considering a satisfac-
tory a priori theory of the processes involved in the measurement
instruments themselves. For the latter reason, it has been argued
that there has also been confusion between issues of validity (e.g.,
discriminant or construct) and issues of reliability (e.g., specificity
and precision). In the context of these challenges, the measure-
ment of vividness has been hotly debated. As Pearson (1995)
points out, vividness is usually measured using the Vividness of
Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) or its updated version, the
VVIQ2 (Marks, 1995). However, these are not ideal measures for
the experimental study of vividness per se, as they only measure the
overall individual’s ability to generate vivid mental images (“trait
vividness”), not differences between single experiences of men-
tal imagery (“state vividness”). To study specific processes behind
the phenomenon of vividness itself, it is more appropriate to use
trial-by-trial self-reports in which the vividness of each individual
mental image is rated immediately after its generation by the sub-
ject (Begg, 1988; Hertzog and Dunlosky, 2006; D’Angiulli, 2009;
Pearson et al., 2011). The self reports were successfully employed in
several previous studies, where the findings were consistent with
both VVIQ research and new results outside the VVIQ’s realm
of individual differences, which demonstrates that it is a reason-
ably robust measure (D’Angiulli, 2002, 2008, 2009; D’Angiulli and
www.frontiersin.org February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 1 | 1
D’Angiulli et al. Image vividness and unexpected recall
Reeves,2002,2007;Alter and Balcetis,2010; Rabin et al.,2010; Pear-
son et al., 2011). Despite these successes, so far there has been no
clear empirical evidence showing exactly why trial-by-trial vivid-
ness reports should be considered more informative and reliable
than the VVIQ. Do these sets of verbal reports reflect different or
overlapping processes?
Many of the mentioned challenges could be mitigated by devel-
oping a model of processes underlying trial-by-trial vividness
self-reports in visual mental image generation tasks, as opposed
to just VVIQ measurement. One of the goals of the model should
be to clarify the non-epiphenomenal role of the subjective vivid-
ness experience, a fundamental and difficult issue that continues
to elude research efforts. An opportunity to gain some upper hand
may be offered by conditions in which vivid imagery influences
incidental recall in example situations such as the one mentioned
earlier. The link between vividness and incidental recall was first
suggested long ago (Richardson, 1969; Paivio, 1971) but the best
evidence comes from studies showing that self-reported vivid-
ness is related with incidental recall of imagery-evoking verbal
cues (Sheehan and Neisser, 1969; Sheehan, 1971, 1972b, 1973). In
a typical paradigm devised by Sheehan (1972a), “vivid imagers”
and “non-vivd imagers,” as defined by the VVIQ, were either
intentionally or incidentally instructed to recall concrete (high
imagery-evoking) and abstract (low imagery-evoking) words.
Results showed that vivid imagers recalled concrete words sig-
nificantly better in the incidental than in the intentional recall
condition; whereas recall of abstract words was similarly poor in
both conditions.
In another line of research, Neisser and Kerr used objec-
tive methods of mnemonic effectiveness and response time to
study the spatial properties of visual imagery (Neisser and Kerr,
1973; Keenan and Moore, 1979; Kerr and Neisser, 1983). They
asked the subjects to construct images in three different condi-
tions according to presented sentences describing two objects in
a given reciprocal spatial relation (concealed, next to/“pictorial,”
far from/“separate”) and measured incidental recall rates of target
verbal cues. Visual images acted as mnemonics in the concealed
condition as well as the “pictorial” condition. If the procedure
changed subtly and intentional learning was used instead, the
objects in the concealed condition were recalled no better than
the separate condition. The data from these experiments also
showed that concealed images were less vivid than pictorial images,
and response time was longer for less vivid images. Although
instruction for imagery/recall had an effect on imagery vividness,
incidental recall was invariably found to predict vividness even
in studies that attempted to falsify Neisser and Kerr’s findings
(Keenan, 1983).
The association between vividness and incidental recall is a rel-
atively consistent finding across several different conditions and
manipulations, and suggests that incidental recall could be used
as the benchmark variable against which alternative hypothe-
ses on the nature of imagery vividness and its function could
be compared. Because older research had several shortcomings,
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate, generalize, and extend
said relationship. Most of those studies used global or delayed self-
report of vividness. In addition, image generation time was con-
founded with vividness, and most paradigms did not clearly show
whether the observed effects were discriminatively and specifi-
cally linked to recall processes (refer to Sheehan, 1973, for one
exception). Furthermore, individual differences were often glob-
ally defined by the VVIQ, such that “good” versus “poor” imagers
determined “high” versus “low” vividness, respectively. Finally, the
lack of control for factors relating to the cued words themselves was
a consistent problem in previous research. In the present research,
a direct imagery and incidental recall paradigm were used, and sev-
eral verbal properties were controlled for (age of word acquisition,
word familiarity/frequency, imageability, and concreteness).
We compared two hypothetical cognitive components of men-
tal image generation from verbal descriptions, which possibly
could account for the outcomes of Experiment 1. If the relation-
ship between vividness and unexpected recall were contingent
upon shared processing while encoding the cues in the study
phase (image generation), a possible relationship may be explained
by depth of elaboration (Craik and Lockhart, 1972; Eysenck and
Eysenck, 1980). The more time spent elaborating the imagined
material, the more subjectively vivid the material should be. Sub-
sequently, this should lead to better retention and recall in the test
phase (free incidental recall). The main predictions derived from
this hypothesis were that: (1) a direct relationship between image
latency and incidental recall should exist, as should a relationship
between incidental recall and self-rated vividness; (2) however,
the correlation between vividness and incidental recall should be
accounted for by image latency. Therefore, the correlation between
vividness and incidental recall should be non-significant and/or
correspond to a small effect size when image latency would be
controlled for.
A possible alternative based on neurocognitive considerations is
that vividness ratings rely on an index of the availability of multiple
sensory traces in long-term memory (Hintzman and Block, 1971).
Thus, because the strength of vividness would reflect the magni-
tude of the networks of sensory traces consolidated from episodic
memory (Morris and Hampson, 1983; Rabbitt and Winthorpe,
1988), higher vividness ratings should be associated with better
incidental recall performance (higher likelihood of accessing long-
term traces). This model would also predict that the relationship
between vividness and incidental recall can be partly explained
by individual differences in participants’ ability to access long-
term memory sensory information based on the prior estimate of
availability supported by vividness judgments. The latter aspect
could be conceived as a “meta-imagery” contribution, where the
vividness judgment may reflect “a judgment of the richness of
the current image combined with an estimate of the additional
sensory information that could be incorporated, should the task
requirements change.”(Baddeley and Andrade,2000; p. 141). Con-
sequently, individuals with greater metacognitive ability should
experience more vivid images,be more efficient and faster in gener-
ating images, and yield higher incidental recall than the individuals
who possess a reduced metacognitive ability. If greater vividness
were related to greater incidental recall accuracy, and the rela-
tionship was not simply due to longer image latencies, then this
would support the hypothesis that vividness acts as an index of
stored memory trace availability, and plays a non-epiphenomenal
role in determining the likelihood of accessing such memories in
long-term memory.
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In all the following experiments, explicit instructions to gener-
ate mental images was adopted as this manipulation has proven
to be perhaps the most reliable and most direct way to ensure that
participants are actually generating mental images, as shown by
converging evidence from hundreds of studies showing that the
report of having an image at request is associated with behav-
ioral, neural, or clinical neuropsychological indices. In addition,
while direct interference of imagery on low-level perception is
an established phenomenon (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1987),
the opposite effect, direct interference of low-level perception on
imagery, is either weak and ubiquitous (see D’Angiulli, 2002) or is
based again on introspective reports (as in Baddeley and Andrade,
2000). Therefore, the latter manipulations are no better or different




Participants were 26 first-year university students age range = 17–
25; 14 female and 12 male). None had participated in an imagery
study before (Campos et al., 2007). Participants signed up through
a subject pool within 3 weeks of beginning introductory psychol-
ogy courses, with 2% credit toward their final grade used as incen-
tive. No significance was found for gender or age against any fac-
tors, so these variables were dropped from further consideration.
Stimuli
A body of 60 verbal description-cues from previous research
(D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2002; available in D’Angiulli, 2001a) were
matched with regards to noun or compound word frequency,
imageability, concreteness, and reading time. These cues included
single-noun and double-noun descriptions comprising both ani-
mate (e.g., dog, cat) and inanimate objects (e.g., car, bottle). The
present data showed no significant differences between the two
subsets of stimuli in terms of vividness or latency of elicited
imagery. Secondary analyses indicated that these descriptions were
rated as emotionally neutral, with negligible inter-item variabil-
ity along a simple emotional rating scale (D’Angiulli, 2001b). In
addition, the 10 noun-cues were selected from earlier research
(Paivio et al., 1968) to use as buffer items during the incidental
recall phase of the experiment (i.e., to filter out recency and pri-
macy effects during recall). The 60 cues were presented in random
order, preceded by five buffer noun-cues and followed by five other
buffer noun-cues (which were presented in a fixed order).
Stimuli properties previously shown to intercorrelate were con-
trolled for. Verbal cues with higher concreteness levels were shown
to be recalled at significantly higher rates (Paivio, 1971), as were
high frequency words (e.g., Miller and Roodenrys, 2009). Image-
ability, which refers to how easily a mental image can be generated
from a word, has been correlated with concreteness (Tse and Altar-
riba, 2007). Age of acquisition, which refers to the average age a
word enters a subject’s lexicon was indirectly controlled for, as it
is highly correlated with both imageability (Ma et al., 2009) and
concreteness (Barry and Gerhand, 2003). The well-validated MRC
Psycholinguistic Database (Clark, 1997) was used to ensure the
words used for cuing had approximately the same scores on these
factors. Because it was assumed that vividness is an image-specific
process, and it could not be rated if an image does not reach to
conscious awareness, all cases rated “no image” were eliminated
from our analysis.
PROCEDURE
The protocol for Experiment 1 was approved by the Carleton
University Research Ethics Board.
Image generation phase
Participants were seated facing a computer monitor and pressed
the right mouse button to begin each trial. Upon clicking the
mouse, an alerting beep was sounded, followed 250 ms later by the
display of a noun-cue at the center of the screen. Participants were
instructed to read the cue silently and as quickly as possible. They
were immediately asked to generate an image that corresponded to
the noun-cue. Participants were required to press the right mouse
button again when they considered their image to be complete,
and at its most vivid.
Upon pressing the button, another alerting beep was sounded,
followed 250 ms later by a horizontal array of seven choices appear-
ing near the bottom of the screen. From left to right, each button
was labeled with one of seven vividness level descriptions in a
seven-point scale format [(1), “no image”; (2), “very vague/dim”;
(3), “vague/dim”; (4), “not vivid”; (5), “moderately vivid”; (6),
“very vivid”; and (7), “perfectly vivid”], as in Marks (1995). Time
was taken to familiarize participants with the rating system during
pre-test practice sessions. Participants used the mouse to click on
one of these seven buttons, and were instructed to rate any failure
to generate an image as a “no image.” There was no deadline for
their response.
Following the vividness response, the array of buttons disap-
peared and the display reverted back to a screen instructing the
participant to click the mouse when they were ready to begin the
next trial. In an effort to minimize imagery persistence between
trials, stimuli were presented in random order with a minimum
inter-trial interval of 5 s (Craver-Lemley and Reeves, 1987). Par-
ticipants were not informed that latency times were covertly mea-
sured. Button presses were justified as a means to signal a complete
image, which was ready to be rated, and prompt the appearance
of the vividness scale buttons.
Free incidental recall phase
After completing the image generation phase, participants took a
20 min break. Afterward, they were asked to return to the lab to
fill out additional paperwork, to receive course credit, and com-
plete the debriefing process. Prior to the image generation phase,
participants had not been informed that they would be required
to recall any of the stimuli. Upon their return, precisely 30 min
from the end of the image generation phase, they were asked to
complete the incidental recall task, wherein they were required to
recall and record as many of the previously read descriptions as
possible.
Each phase of the experiment was exclusively conducted by
one of two paid undergraduate research assistants. Both research
assistants received training in their module, yet remained naïve
to the purposes and hypotheses of the study. Final debrief-
ing was conducted through an exit interview with the principal
investigator.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Preliminary analyses were conducted on the empirical distribu-
tions of raw response times (RTs) for each level of vividness (except
level 1=“no image”). A total of 1490 valid observations were avail-
able after all cases with a rating of “no image” (5% of total trials)
were removed. Data were binned using the smallest increment that
did not make the histograms appear too irregular. From the initial
binning it became apparent that our RT data could be fitted by
an ex-Gaussian – that is, the convolution of an exponential with
a Gaussian. This ex-Gaussian model has been used successfully
in several experimental paradigms (for reviews, see Ratcliff, 1979,
1993; McNicol and Stewart, 1980; Luce, 1986) to fit explicit the-
oretical distribution functions and to give convenient summary
of empirical RT distributions. The assumption of the ex-Gaussian
model is that RT is the sum of two other random variables, one
distributed as a Gaussian and one distributed as an exponential
(Luce, 1986). Previous work (D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2002) has
supported the hypothesis that the ex-Gaussian model reflects the
time to retrieve images from memory so that “image generation”
can be essentially reduced to “retrieving images from memory.”
Therefore, variations in each of ex-Gaussian parameters across
vividness levels could be assumed to describe the core underly-
ing generative processes common to both imagery and incidental
recall. The ex-Gaussian model was fitted using a robust regression
method due to Hoaglin et al. (1983).
To ensure the ex-Gaussian reflected the shape of the group
data, and the shape of the individual data, the model was first
vincentized for individual data, and then averaged over vivid-
ness levels. Histograms were constructed by pooling the raw RTs
from each vividness level over subjects, irrespective of the individ-
ual source of the RTs. This method has been used in situations
where there are too few trials for single subjects (see Ratcliff,
1979). We verified whether the related observations were seri-
ally independent and not autocorrelated for each subject, if so we
could assume independence of collective observations (see Neter
et al., 1996). In our case, the Durbin–Watson autocorrelation test
statistic D clearly exceeded the upper bound in the assessment
of each subject [du > 1.62; α= 0.05; n= 60; lag= 1] as well as
for each vividness level submitted to fitting, thereby showing no
autocorrelation.
Table 1 shows the ex-Gaussian fit to the distribution histograms
of RTs obtained for each vividness level. For each distribution, the
ex-Gaussian fit explained at least 68% of the variance associated
with RTs. The general distribution of the vividness data showed
the median rating was a value of 4 (“non-vivid”). Examination of
each vividness level regressed onto RTs showed both distributions
were best summarized by piecewise linear regressions of oppo-
site slope. These data supported a clear split between vivid (rating
values 5–7) and non-vivid (2–4) observations.
The Gaussian of both vivid images (levels 5–7) and less vivid
images (levels< 4) are reported in Figure 1. Both distributions
have comparable standard deviation, as evidenced by the left tail
of the distributions. However, the distribution of less vivid images
is delayed >500 ms, as evidenced by the shift on the time axis.
Consistent with previous findings (D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2002),
more vivid images were typically associated with shorter Gaussian
latency components than were less vivid images. It is important
Table 1 | Results of the ex-Gaussian fit to empirical image latency
distributions in unconstrained image generation phase of Experiment
1 (see text for details).
Vividness λ µ r2 MRT SDRT N
2 18046.0 1500.0 0.68 19547.2 26055.7 17
3 8807.0 2500.0 0.95 11307.2 14520.5 31
4 18641.0 5000.0 0.95 23641.2 28188.5 64
5 12027.0 2500.0 0.96 14527.3 16280.8 174
6 11612.0 2500.0 0.96 14112.3 15416.4 328
7 8162.0 5000.0 0.99 12162.0 18938.2 449
All values reported in the table – except the ones corresponding to n’s – are in
ms; 500< σ<1000. Robust regression with Ramsay’s weighting function.
FIGURE 1 | Ex-Gaussian model-fit of RT distributions for images rated
with vividness 2–4 and 5–7 in Experiment 1.
to point out the enormous variability in the response latencies,
and that the relationship between vividness could not be easily
guessed by naïve participants. Therefore, it is rather implausible
that the observed pattern might be due to response-bias based on
an explicit or conscious criterion-shift, or set of decisions, since
this would have required the participants to first tacitly simulate
the ex-Gaussian model, and then retrofit their responses coher-
ently to the model to produce the observed pattern. Because this
would have to be done uniformly by all participants, the variability
should have been much more contained than what we observed.
The key analysis examined the predictability of recall and
RTs from vividness rating category (non-vivid versus vivid). In
an effort to meet assumptions for parametric procedures and
augment robustness to violations, the distribution of RTs was
normalized with a logarithmic transformation, after which no
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FIGURE 2 | Mean proportion of incidental recall for verbal cues
corresponding to vivid (rating: 5–7) and non-vivid (rating: 2–4) images
in Experiment 1.
multivariate outliers were detected. Figure 2 shows the within-
subject mean proportion of incidentally recalled imagery-evoking
verbal cues presented during the image generation phase against
the rated vividness level. Figure 3 shows the within-subjects mean
RTs of image generation against the rated vividness level (for pre-
sentation, RT data are expressed as seconds, derived from antilog
transformation). The proportion of recalled cues corresponding
to vivid images was 0.77 (SE= 0.05), whereas the proportion
of recalled cues corresponding to non-vivid images was 0.19
(SE= 0.04). A paired samples test showed the difference to be sig-
nificant [t (25)= 6.69; p< 0.0001],explaining 74% of the variance.
In contrast, the mean RTs for vivid (14.8 s, SE= 2.71) and non-
vivid (13.33, SE= 2.14) cues did not differ [t (25)< 1, p= 0.34;
R2< 0.01].
A linear regression analysis examining the effect of individual
differences on the total number of images recalled showed that
14% of the variance in incidental recall accuracy was explained by
participants’ average vividness rating [F(1, 25)= 4.05, MSe= 0.38,
p= 0.05]. Therefore, the role of individual differences was modest
and its effect size (r) was significantly smaller than that of vividness
described earlier (0.86 versus 0.37, z = 3.07, p= 0.002).
A two-predictor model (stimulus and vividness) was fit-
ted to the data to test the hypothesis regarding relationship
between vividness and recall. Stimulus was plotted as a nom-
inal factor, in which each category was a noun-cue. It was
included as a predictor to ensure vividness effects were not
due to the tendency for some words to produce more vivid
images than others. The resulting model [Predicted logit of
(Recall)= 0.664+ β1∗Vividness+ β2∗Stimuli] was statistically reli-
able,χ2(62, 1441)= 340.969, p< 0.001 (see Appendix A for analy-
sis details). According to the model, greater vividness ratings
for noun-cues predicted recall with an overall success rate of
72.2%. The model correctly classified 83.7% of unrecalled cues
and 54.7% of recalled cues. Stimulus and vividness generate a
FIGURE 3 | Mean image generation time for verbal cues corresponding
to vivid (rating: 5–7) and non-vivid (rating: 2–4) images in Experiment 1.
statistically significant predictive model for recall (see Appen-
dix) that accounted for 28.3% of the variance in incidental
recall. No change was observed if the model was fit to pre-
dict recall when response time was added as a predictor [χ2(65,
1490)= 389.437, p< 0.001]. RT did not exert an influence on the
model (B=−0.002, p= 0.587), which further confirmed the null
effect of RT on recall. Therefore, vividness could not account
for recall accuracy simply because participants spent more time
imagining the items corresponding to the verbal cues.
A linear mixed model was fit to the data to assess the contribu-
tion of stimulus and RTs to linear change in vividness of imagery.
The variables in the model were evaluated by a Type III test. Since
the sample size was not large, Restricted Iterative Generalized Least
-squares (RIGLS) was used (Goldstein, 1986). Stimuli and RT had
a significant effect on vividness [F(59, 1000)= 1.59, η2= 0.086,
p< 0.05], and F(1, 1103)= 5.17,η2= 0.005, p< 0.05, respectively.
Therefore, because the effects were small, RTs and stimuli influ-
enced vividness only minimally. There was no interaction between
stimuli and RTs (F< 1).
To determine if recall and vividness ratings were affected by the
verbal properties of the word stimuli that were not kept constant
during stimulus selection, correlation analyses were conducted on
age of acquisition, and familiarity versus recall. No significant rela-
tionship was found between the percentage of participants that
recalled a cue, and either age of acquisition (r = 0.213, p= 0.317)
or familiarity scores (r = 0.118, p= 0.445). In addition, effects of
stimuli regressed onto vividness, recall and RTs all explained less
than 0.5% of the variance.
The results of Experiment 1 implicate vividness ratings as a
predictor of incidental recall for imagery-evoking cues. The effect
of individual differences in imaging ability on incidental recall was
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much smaller than the effect of vividness. Because image latency
was unrelated to incidental recall, and inversely related to vivid-
ness, these data were incompatible with the depth of elaboration
account. Because the effect of vividness on incidental recall for
verbal cues was tested, the influence of expectancy and demand
characteristics were minimized. These results support the valid-
ity of vividness as a measurable construct, and as an entity which
may represent real underlying memory processes. Vividness rat-
ings likely reflect a process which provides a natural mnemonic for
unexpected retrieval of implicitly coded information (see Kosslyn
et al., 2006).
EXPERIMENT 2
Although Experiment 1 did not include a measure of VVIQ, inci-
dental and intentional recall has traditionally shown a modest
correlation with the VVIQ and VVIQ2, with average effect sizes
generally of about r = 0.13 (see McKelvie, 1995; Dean and Mor-
ris, 2003). More recent evidence suggests the relationship between
VVIQ2 and trial-by-trial vividness ratings is weak to moderate
(r < 0.20) (D’Angiulli, 2001a; D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2007). Also,
the patterns of results from Sheehan (1971, 1972b) suggest the
quality of imagery is contingent upon properties of the stimuli
within the setting of each trial, and predicts incidental free recall
and recognition performance. Lastly, other studies found the mod-
est correlation between trial-by-trial ratings and VVIQ holds only
for female participants (Sheehan, 1971, 1973).
In contrast with these findings, Pearson et al. (2011) reported
large predictive effects of both trial-by-trial vividness ratings and
VVIQ2 scores when related to bias in reporting a dominant pattern
during a binocular rivalry task. The underlying assumption was
that similar metacognitive processes (i.e., knowing how and what
the observer knows about his/her own processes of visual mental
imagery) would be used in trial-by-trial vividness ratings and in
VVIQ2. If this assumption is correct, the overlapping processes
could shed some light on the results of our Experiment 1. One
interpretation of the results of Experiment 1 is that trial-by-trial
vividness ratings may be accounted for by the same metacogni-
tive judgment processes involved in responding to the VVIQ2.
Experiment 2 was designed to examine the putative relationship
between vividness ratings and VVIQ2. If the association between
the VVIQ2 and vividness ratings were confirmed in Experiment
2, then one may also explain the basis through which vividness
ratings could predict incidental recall in terms of the overlapping
metacognitive processes involved in the VVIQ2.
The design of Experiment 2 was a variation of the paradigm
used by Baddeley and Andrade (2000). Upon completing the
VVIQ2, female participants were asked to read a short description
of a static or dynamic scene, and press a key upon generating com-
plete visual mental image. Participants then rated the vividness and
the subjectively perceived latency of the image on a trial-by-trial
basis. If, as the results of Experiment 1 would suggest, vividness
ratings are based on an index of multiple sensory traces available in
long-term memory, this account would predict: (1) higher trial-
by-trial vividness ratings for dynamic scenes than static scenes,
and (2) a negative (i.e., inverse) relationship between trial-by-trial
vividness and perceived imagery latency. The VVIQ2 should cor-
relate with trial-by-trial vividness ratings from both dynamic and
static scenes, but should not relate to perceived imagery latency
when the effects of vividness are removed.
Conversely, if the VVIQ2 accounts for most of the relation-
ship between trial-by-trial vividness ratings and perceived imagery
latency, then vividness judgments could be attributed to similar
individual metacognitive skill differences involved in the two types
of vividness measures (Baddeley and Andrade, 2000; Pearson
et al., 2011). However, because dynamic mental imagery capac-
itates working memory more than static mental imagery, fewer
resources are available for concurrent metacognitive processes.
Then, under such circumstances one would expect less vivid
images for dynamic scenes than static ones.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Participants
Participants were 44 female undergraduate students (age range:
18–25). Participants signed up through a subject pool, with 2%
credit toward their final grade used as incentive. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no reported or
documented learning disabilities. Participation required the atten-
dance of two appointments. The first appointment was a prelimi-
nary screening session, where participants filled out the VVIQ2
and individual data. The second appointment was the experi-
mental session. Five potential participants were excluded from the
experiment, as they were unable to evoke the images as required.
Materials
An adaptation of 17 static and 17 dynamic scene descriptions were
used (Baddeley and Andrade, 2000; Experiment 4, see Appendix A,
p. 144). The scenes were adapted such that words including British
content (e.g., Big Ben) were substituted with equally long words
describing North American content (e.g., CNN Tower) which were
validated through pilot experiments. During the screening phase,
a question from the visual portion of the procedure for assessing
expectations on the vividness of imagery was asked (Baddeley and
Andrade, 2000; see Appendix C, Q2, Question 2, p. 145). After the
experimental phase, a tacit knowledge assessment procedure was
administered.
PROCEDURE
The protocol for Experiment 2 was approved by the Carleton
University Research Ethics Board.
Participants were given instructions, and 10 min of practice
with five dynamic and five static imagery scenes. Between each
practice trial, participants were required to report how well they
could control each image. Only participant ratings with vividness
greater than “extremely slow” (1) for 80% of the practice trials
qualified for the entire experiment. One participant was elimi-
nated from the initial pool under such criteria. Upon completing
the practice session, participants verbally repeated the instructions
to the experimenter to ensure the instructions were understood.
Participants were instructed to silently read a description of a
dynamic or static scene displayed on a computer screen, which
occurred 250 ms after an alerting beep. The experiment consisted
of 17 dynamic, and 17 static descriptions. Participants were tested
individually, and the procedure lasted approximately 40 min.
Upon reading each description, participants were required to press
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a key to indicate the description was understood. Participants were
instructed to imagine the description with their eyes open, and as
seen from the front. Outline drawings were shown as examples
before the experiment began. Each description was presented in
random order with an inter-trial interval of 5 s (Craver-Lemley
and Reeves, 1987). Upon forming a complete mental image, par-
ticipants were required to press a button on a mouse. Four seconds
after the button press, participants were shown buttons to rate per-
ceived vividness, and perceived latency of the images. Participants
were asked to rate their image as “complete” or “finished” when the
image was maximally clear and detailed (see Cocude and Denis,
1988). Participants were required to rate their mental image as
they had experienced it at the time of the key press. There was no
deadline for the rating responses.
The presentation order of the scales was randomized, such
that vividness could follow or precede perceived imagery rating.
The second rating task followed immediately after the first rat-
ing response. The vividness scale consisted of a horizontal array
of seven buttons appearing at the center of the screen. From left
to right, each button was labeled with a short description cor-
responding to one of seven levels of the vividness scale used in
Experiment 1. The imagery latency (speed) scale consisted of a hor-
izontal array of seven buttons appearing at the center of the screen.
From left to right, each button was labeled with a short descrip-
tion corresponding to one of the seven levels: from“extremely fast”
(7), to “extremely slow” (1). Valid trials were defined by vividness
greater than 1. Subjects were instructed to give a “1” response
if they were unable to form a mental image. Upon completing
the experiment,participants underwent a post-experimental inter-
view, wherein they quickly described what they had imagined for
seven randomly probed descriptions from both dynamic and sta-
tic condition. Post-experimental interviews were concluded with
the tacit knowledge assessment procedure (Baddeley and Andrade,
2000), and included the following question:
“We are interested in knowing if you think that there was a
relationship between how vivid your images were and other
factors. Please just tell us what you expect or think, please do
not use images to answer the question, we are just interested
in what you predict or think about things that may be related
or may determine the vividness of your images.”
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To eliminate effects of discrepant scales, total scores for the
VVIQ2 were converted to mean vividness values through a
simple linear transformation. The transformation resulted in
a seven-point scale; henceforth, referred to as mean vviq2.
As in Experiment 1, we considered only valid responses. The
rate of excluded invalid trials was approximately 3% (level
1=“no image”), a proportion similar to Experiment 1. On
average, images were reported as moderately vivid, and were
produced at a relatively fast perceived latency in both static
(M viv.= 5.31, SDviv.= 0.55; M speed= 5.40, SDspeed= 0.39) and
dynamic (M viv.= 5.29, SD= 0.77; M speed= 5.59, SDspeed= 0.62)
conditions. Paired samples contrasts showed dynamic imagery was
perceived as significantly faster than static imagery [t (38)= 2.52,
p< 0.025]. However, mean vividness ratings did not differ
between the two conditions [t(38)< 1, p= 0.797]. The latter result
differed from Baddeley and Andrade’s findings (Experiment 4).
(They found dynamic imagery was significantly less vivid than
static imagery). Images produced for the VVIQ2 were signifi-
cantly more vivid (M vviq2= 5.68, SDvviq2= 0.62) than vividness
for static images [t (38)= 3.88, p< 0.0001], and dynamic images
[t (38)= 2.83, p< 0.01].These data may be interpreted as evidence
that participants were generally much more confident in their
imagery abilities than what they were capable of demonstrat-
ing during the experimental procedure. The discrepancy between
trial-by-trial vividness level and VVIQ2 imply a lack of agree-
ment between metacognitive judgment as measured through the
VVIQ2, and verbal reports specific to the actual imagery task.
Table 2 shows correlations among all measures. VVIQ2 was sig-
nificantly correlated with vividness of static imagery, but was not
related to vividness of dynamic imagery, nor perceived latency in
both static and dynamic imagery conditions. A very strong inverse
relationship between trial-by-trial vividness ratings and perceived
imagery latency was observed in both static and dynamic imagery
conditions, with strong to marginal evidence of the same trends
in crossed conditions.
Whereas vividness ratings correlated with perceived latency, the
VVIQ2 did not. These data provide very weak evidence validating
the VVIQ2, when the criterion is a self-report, subjective third
variable. Logically, one would not expect any predictive success
of VVIQ2 in relation to a behavioral variable such as incidental
recall. The observed patterns were analyzed to determine if they
could be predicted by expectations or tacit knowledge (Pylyshyn,
2003). There was no significant difference in the number of partic-
ipants expecting vivid imagery to be less or more vivid than static
imagery (χ2 < 1). Figure 4 describes participant responses con-
cerning self-rated predictions about the type of relationship they
expect to exist between perceived vividness and perceived imagery
latency, as documented during the preliminary screening session.
Most participants predicted a positive relationship, or no rela-
tionship between vividness and imagery latency. One participant
correctly predicted the inverse relationship. Upon removing the
data of this participant from the analysis, there were no significant
differences between results.
In conclusion, the association between the VVIQ2 and vivid-
ness ratings was not observed consistently in both the conditions
of Experiment 2, and if collapsed across conditions (static and
dynamic) the effect becomes modest and not significant. VVIQ2
Table 2 | Correlation matrix among VVIQ2 and self-reported image
vividness ratings and perceived generation speed in dynamic and









VVIQ2 0.259 0.505** 0.044 −0.219
Dyn. vividness – 0.679** −0.626** −0.652**
Stat. vividness – – −0.282† −0.531**
Dyn. speed – – – 0.622**
Dyn., dynamic imagery condition; Stat., static imagery condition. N=39.
†p<0.10, **p<0.01.
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FIGURE 4 | Percentages of participants predicting what type of
relationship they tacitly think there should be between vividness
ratings and speed of imagery in Experiment 2.
also failed to validate against a third self-report criterion variable
(perceived image latency). If the VVIQ2 assesses individual differ-
ences in metacognitive ability, it seems implausible that such abili-
ties would predict incidental recall. Because trial-by-trial vividness
predicted incidental recall, the metacognitive aspects assumed to
be reflected by VVIQ2 do not appear to influence vividness and
the mental imagery process to a significant degree.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Despite controlling for imageability, concreteness, age of acquisi-
tion, and verbal frequency/familiarity, the results from Experiment
1 showed a positive relationship between vividness ratings and
incidental recall of imagery-evoking cues. These results are not
consistent with depth of elaboration, as faster image generation
latencies accompanied higher vividness ratings, a pattern opposite
to what depth of elaboration would predict. Furthermore, because
depth of elaboration predicts a positive correlation between inci-
dental recall and image generation time, it again fails to account
for the data from Experiment 1.
Our findings are compatible with an alternative model of
vividness processes based on multi-trace memory theory (MMT;
Moscovitch et al., 2005). This model proposes that vividness rat-
ings are based on an index of the availability of multiple sensory
traces in long-term memory, the strength of vividness reflect-
ing the magnitude of the networks of sensory traces that have
been consolidated from episodic memory. This is described by the
inverse relationship between vividness ratings and image latency
(the “vivid-is-fast” relation). Thus, higher vividness ratings are
associated with higher likelihood of incidental recall, as shown by
the data of Experiment 1.
The follow-up results observed in Experiment 2 showed that
individual differences, as measured by the VVIQ2, are not a viable
account for the relationship in Experiment 1 between vividness
and incidental recall. Most important, the results of Experiment
2 also suggest that if there were metacognitive aspects involved in
trial-by-trial vividness ratings, they would not likely be the same
ones underlying VVIQ measures. Taken together the results of
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 are consistent with those observed
in a meta-analysis we conducted, representing 5% of the litera-
ture pertaining to “vividness” and “VVIQ” (reported in Appendix
B). The proportion of significant and non-significant experimen-
tal outcomes for trial-by-trial vividness ratings and VVIQ factor
effects were calculated. For behavioral, cognitive, and neural mea-
sures, a greater number of significant experimental outcomes
accompanied trial-by-trial vividness ratings than the VVIQ. Fur-
thermore, the correlation between VVIQ scores and trial-by-trial
vividness ratings for 21 entries showed an average correlation of
0.15, and variability in these values ranged from r =−0.27, to
r = 0.64. Consistent with the results of experiment 2, these addi-
tional results support the contention that trial-by-trial vividness
self-reports and VVIQ scores share some descriptive properties
of visual imagery. However, trial-by-trial vividness ratings seem to
resolve the construct of mental imagery with much greater reliabil-
ity. Although metacognitive processes may be occurring in single
trial judgment, it is perhaps more parsimonious to assume that
vividness ratings are mostly a form of Level 2 retrospective verbal
reports (Ericsson and Simon, 1993).
Considered as retrospective verbal reports, vividness ratings
may be based on a direct translation of residual top-down sen-
sory traces available in long-term memory (D’Angiulli and Reeves,
2002), wherein vividness intensity is proportional to the mag-
nitude of sensory traces available. This statement agrees with
a number of neurocognitive considerations borne out of MMT
research. According to that theoretical framework, each sensory
trace is distributed across the cortex, such that various distributive
patterns are unique to a specific sensory input, and is distinct from
all other distributive patterns (Hintzman, 1976). Sensory traces
are thought to be indexed by the hippocampus (Ryan et al., 2001),
and integrated into a mental image by the cuneus, precuneus, and
occipital lobes (Svoboda et al., 2006; Svoboda and Levine, 2009;
Cabeza and St. Jacques, 2007). However, hippocampal indexing
becomes less influential as each individual sensory trace is inte-
grated into cortical networks through successive (re)presentations
(Takashima et al., 2009). Mental images are consolidated neural
patterns that correspond to these “synthetic” sensory long-term
traces, whose levels of interconnectedness are correlated to their
perceived reportable vividness (Rabin et al., 2010).
Our study also indicates that although the VVIQ or VVIQ2
may very well measure an individual’s ability to generate vivid
mental images (“trait vividness”), it likely lacks the resolution
to measure an individual’s ability to experience vivid mental
images in specific situational contexts (“state vividness”). To study
specific processes behind the phenomenon of vividness itself
(rather than “trait vividness”), it is perhaps more appropriate to
use trial-by-trial self-reports, wherein vividness is rated imme-
diately after its generation (Begg, 1988; Hertzog and Dunlosky,
2006; D’Angiulli, 2009; Pearson et al., 2011). Such self-reports
have met with compounding success progressing beyond the
VVIQ’s realm of individual differences, while remaining generally
consistent with it. Vividness ratings demonstrate the reasonably
robust nature of self-reports as a measure of “state” and “trait”
vividness (D’Angiulli, 2002; D’Angiulli and Reeves, 2002, 2007;
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D’Angiulli, 2009; Alter and Balcetis, 2010; Rabin et al., 2010; Pear-
son et al., 2011). This particular issue is critical given the recent
resurgence of use of the VVIQ in cognitive neuroscience – espe-
cially in the realm of neuroimaging (Amedi et al., 2005; Palmiero
et al., 2010).
In summary, we found that trial-by-trial vividness ratings pre-
dict incidental recall, and the relationship cannot be attributed
to depth of elaboration or metacognitive processes related to self-
appraisal of individual imagery ability, as measured by the VVIQ2.
Our results suggest that vividness of imagery makes implicit infor-
mation available to consciousness, and to some extent, is linked
with the associative processes through which phenomenal avail-
ability translates into access of incidental episodic memories.
Therefore, we conclude, in certain conditions conscious phenom-
enological experience associated with imagery does not have a
trivial role as it can have a critical influence on recall performance.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
A linear mixed model was fit to the data to assess the contribution
of the variables to linear change in vividness of imagery. The analy-
sis was carried out using SPSS17. The variables in the model were
evaluated by a Type III test. Since the sample size was not large,
Restricted Iterative Generalized Least Square (RIGLS) estimation
method was used. Table A1 shows the type III tests of fixed effects.
(Cases with rating of “no image” (vividness rating value 1) were
excluded from all analysis).
To test how well the factors in the dataset predict recall, a
logistic regression analysis was performed. The response for recall
was recorded as 1 for recalled verbal descriptions and 0 for not
recalled verbal descriptions. Explanatory variables included vivid-
ness, stimuli, and reaction time (RT). Table A2 displays model
specifications, including the specified distribution and link func-
tion. Table A3 summarizes the results. Table A4 shows the full
model results by predictor.
All 1490 valid observations were entered in the logistic regres-
sion model as the preliminary linear mixed modeling fitting
analysis indicated that residual errors were only modestly cor-
related within each subject and were independent across subjects.
Robustness to the violation of the assumption of independence
was demonstrated by replicating the results with the following
confirmatory repeated measure logistic regression model.
The dichotomous outcome for recall was further modeled with
a repeated measure logistic regression analysis. The model was
Table A1 |Type III tests of fixed effects in linear mixed model analysis
testing the influences of stimuli and image generation time (RTs) on
vividness ratings.
Source df numerator df denominator F P
Intercept 1 632.643 3002.619 0.000
Stimuli 59 1000.202 1.588 0.004
RTs 1 1103.724 5.172 0.023
Stimuli×RTs 59 1046.513 0.956 0.572
Dependent variable: vividness.






Table A3 | Evaluation result for logistic regression predictive model for
incidental recall using stimuli and vividness as predictor.
Predicted




Non-recalled 779 142 83.7




based on the probability of the largest value of response variable,
which was 1. Two stimuli, which caused singularity of Hessian
matrix, were removed from the dataset, resulting in 1441 obser-
vations (and no difference in the results). Models specifications,
including the specified distribution and link function were same
as the initial logistic regression model.
Type III test evaluated the effect of explanatory variables
on recall accuracy in the purposed model. The test result
showed that Vividness and stimuli were significant predic-
tors for recall, χ2= 14.77 and χ2= 4276, p< 0.05 respectively
(see Table A5). No other significance was found. Table A6
shows estimation for parameters in the model. Table A7 shows
validity of predicted probabilities. The prediction for descrip-
tions which were not recalled was more accurate than that
for the verbal descriptions which were, 50.5% of non-recalled
descriptions and 22% of recalled descriptions were correctly
predicted. This confirmed that the model had overall 72.5%
accuracy.
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Table A4 | Logistic regression analysis of vividness and incidental recall data.
Predictor β SE Wald df p Exp (β)
Vividness 17.426 5 0.004
Vividness (1) −0.091 0.374 0.059 1 0.808 0.913
Vividness (2) 0.315 0.362 0.760 1 0.383 1.371
Vividness (3) 0.684 0.317 4.647 1 0.031 1.982
Vividness (4) 0.537 0.305 3.100 1 0.078 1.712
Vividness (5) 0.850 0.307 7.684 1 0.006 2.341
Stimuli 246.836 57 0.000
Stimuli (1) −2.776 0.751 13.658 1 0.000 0.062
Stimuli (2) −2.511 0.690 13.256 1 0.000 0.081
Stimuli (3) −2.485 0.690 12.955 1 0.000 0.083
Stimuli (4) −0.873 0.659 1.755 1 0.185 0.418
Stimuli (5) 1.055 0.894 1.393 1 0.238 2.873
Stimuli (6) −2.783 0.710 15.374 1 0.000 0.062
Stimuli (7) −3.751 0.895 17.561 1 0.000 0.023
Stimuli (8) −1.146 0.658 3.035 1 0.082 0.318
Stimuli (9) −2.282 0.696 10.739 1 0.001 0.102
Stimuli (10) −3.082 0.743 17.185 1 0.000 0.046
Stimuli (11) −0.587 0.662 0.788 1 0.375 0.556
Stimuli (12) −3.852 0.893 18.601 1 0.000 0.021
Stimuli (13) −0.987 0.647 2.330 1 0.127 0.373
Stimuli (14) −0.684 0.663 1.064 1 0.302 0.505
Stimuli (15) −0.008 0.696 0.000 1 0.991 0.992
Stimuli (16) −2.110 0.680 9.636 1 0.002 0.121
Stimuli (17) −2.882 0.747 14.874 1 0.000 0.056
Stimuli (18) −2.528 0.689 13.458 1 0.000 0.080
Stimuli (19) 0.254 0.744 0.117 1 0.733 1.289
Stimuli (20) −2.955 0.745 15.724 1 0.000 0.052
Stimuli (21) −3.342 0.797 17.586 1 0.000 0.035
Stimuli (22) −1.610 0.647 6.186 1 0.013 0.200
Stimuli (23) −2.172 0.679 10.230 1 0.001 0.114
stimuli(24) −0.780 0.661 1.391 1 0.238 0.458
Stimuli (25) −2.358 0.695 11.524 1 0.001 0.095
Stimuli (26) −1.756 0.658 7.112 1 0.008 0.173
Stimuli (27) −2.515 0.689 13.305 1 0.000 0.081
Stimuli (28) −3.760 0.895 17.656 1 0.000 0.023
Stimuli (29) −1.680 0.650 6.682 1 0.010 0.186
Stimuli (30) −2.244 0.676 11.026 1 0.001 0.106
Stimuli (31) −2.098 0.664 10.001 1 0.002 0.123
Stimuli (32) −2.052 0.666 9.500 1 0.002 0.128
Stimuli (33) −0.850 0.655 1.685 1 0.194 0.427
Stimuli (34) −1.538 0.651 5.577 1 0.018 0.215
Stimuli (35) −3.255 0.798 16.655 1 0.000 0.039
Stimuli (36) −0.493 0.664 0.551 1 0.458 0.611
Stimuli (37) −1.570 0.656 5.724 1 0.017 0.208
Stimuli (38) −0.527 0.658 0.641 1 0.423 0.590
Stimuli (39) −1.746 0.649 7.245 1 0.007 0.174
Stimuli (40) −1.934 0.672 8.296 1 0.004 0.145
Stimuli (41) −0.115 0.709 0.026 1 0.871 0.891
Stimuli (42) 0.262 0.723 0.132 1 0.716 1.300
Stimuli (43) −0.490 0.667 0.539 1 0.463 0.613
Stimuli (44) −0.764 0.651 1.376 1 0.241 0.466
Stimuli (45) −2.352 0.674 12.196 1 0.000 0.095
(Continued)
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Table A4 | Continued
Predictor β SE Wald df p Exp (β)
Stimuli (46) −1.479 0.645 5.259 1 0.022 0.228
Stimuli (47) −3.562 0.901 15.633 1 0.000 0.028
Stimuli (48) −2.927 0.747 15.370 1 0.000 0.054
Stimuli (49) −1.717 0.650 6.989 1 0.008 0.180
Stimuli (50) −1.421 0.643 4.883 1 0.027 0.241
Stimuli (51) −2.051 0.665 9.501 1 0.002 0.129
Stimuli (52) −1.712 0.682 6.299 1 0.012 0.181
Stimuli (53) −0.028 0.691 0.002 1 0.967 0.972
Stimuli (54) −2.172 0.679 10.238 1 0.001 0.114
Stimuli (55) −2.407 0.691 12.132 1 0.000 0.090
Stimuli (56) −1.138 0.735 2.395 1 0.122 0.321
Stimuli (57) −2.455 0.691 12.612 1 0.000 0.086
Constant 0.664 0.576 1.329 1 0.249 1.943
Variable(s) entered: vividness, stimuli.
Table A5 |Type III test of model effects for repeated measure logistic regression model.
Source Wald χ2 df p
(Intercept) 22.744 1 0.000
Vividness 14.766 5 0.011
RT 0.050 1 0.824
Vividness×RT 6.972 5 0.223
Stimuli 4276.081 25 0.000
Dependent variable: recall.
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Table A6 | Parameter estimate for repeated measure logistic regression.
95% Wald confidence interval Hypothesis test
Parameter β SD Lower Upper Wald df P
(Intercept) 0.905 0.4538 – 1.794 3.976 1 0.046
[vividness=2.00] 1.136 0.3524 0.445 1.826 10.383 1 0.001
[vividness=3.00] 0.748 0.3818 0.000 1.496 3.837 1 0.050
[vividness=4.00] 0.608 0.4688 −0.311 1.526 1.680 1 0.195
[vividness=5.00] 0.162 0.2989 −0.424 0.748 0.295 1 0.587
[vividness=6.00] 0.356 0.2540 −0.142 0.854 1.965 1 0.161
[vividness=7.00] 0a – – – – – –
RT 0.004 0.0054 −0.007 0.015 0.540 1 0.462
[vividness=2.00]× s −0.025 0.0188 −0.062 0.012 1.723 1 0.189
[vividness=3.00]× s 0.018 0.0130 −0.008 0.043 1.892 1 0.169
[vividness=4.00]× s −0.005 0.0132 −0.031 0.021 0.147 1 0.701
[vividness=5.00]× s 0.000 0.0079 −0.016 0.015 0.005 1 0.942
[vividness=6.00]× s −0.004 0.0100 −0.023 0.016 0.146 1 0.702
[vividness=7.00]× s 0a – – – – – –
Stimuli
[stimuli=1.00] −2.481 0.6790 −3.811 −1.150 13.345 1 0.000
[stimuli=2.00] 0.293 0.8285 −1.331 1.917 0.125 1 0.723
[stimuli=3.00] 0.036 0.7209 −1.377 1.449 0.002 1 0.960
[stimuli=4.00] 0.023 0.5302 −1.016 1.062 0.002 1 0.965
[stimuli=5.00] −1.597 0.4804 −2.538 −0.655 11.046 1 0.001
[stimuli=6.00] −3.531 0.7974 −5.094 −1.968 19.609 1 0.000
[stimuli=7.00] 0.318 0.6115 −0.880 1.517 0.271 1 0.603
[stimuli=8.00] 1.291 0.9455 −0.563 3.144 1.863 1 0.172
[stimuli=9.00] −1.313 0.6087 −2.506 −0.120 4.650 1 0.031
[stimuli=10.00] −0.152 0.6943 −1.513 1.209 0.048 1 0.827
[stimuli=11.00] 0.624 0.6256 −0.603 1.850 0.993 1 0.319
[stimuli=12.00] −1.936 0.5493 −3.013 −0.860 12.428 1 0.000
[stimuli=13.00] 1.380 0.6474 0.111 2.649 4.542 1 0.033
[stimuli=14.00] −1.511 0.5988 −2.685 −0.337 6.368 1 0.012
[stimuli=15.00] −1.784 0.5815 −2.924 −0.644 9.410 1 0.002
[stimuli=16.00] −2.427 0.5536 −3.512 −1.342 19.224 1 0.000
[stimuli=17.00] −0.305 0.5736 −1.429 0.819 0.282 1 0.595
[stimuli=18.00] 0.417 0.7336 −1.020 1.855 0.324 1 0.569
[stimuli=19.00] 0.066 0.7188 −1.343 1.475 0.008 1 0.927
[stimuli=20.00] −2.730 0.7174 −4.136 −1.324 14.485 1 0.000
[stimuli=21.00] 0.466 0.5001 −0.514 1.446 0.869 1 0.351
[stimuli=22.00] 0.873 0.6202 −0.342 2.089 1.983 1 0.159
[stimuli=23.00] −0.877 0.6083 −2.069 0.315 2.079 1 0.149
[stimuli=24.00] −0.297 0.7287 −1.725 1.132 0.166 1 0.684
[stimuli=25.00] −1.656 0.6106 −2.853 −0.460 7.359 1 0.007
[stimuli=26.00] −0.097 0.7548 −1.576 1.382 0.016 1 0.898
[stimuli=27.00] −0.711 0.6595 −2.004 0.581 1.164 1 0.281
[stimuli=28.00] 0.054 0.6819 −1.282 1.391 0.006 1 0.937
[stimuli=29.00] 1.313 0.9485 −0.546 3.172 1.915 1 0.166
[stimuli=30.00] −0.786 0.6830 −2.125 0.552 1.326 1 0.249
[stimuli=31.00] −0.227 0.6441 −1.489 1.036 0.124 1 0.725
[stimuli=32.00] −0.366 0.6257 −1.592 0.860 0.342 1 0.559
[stimuli=33.00] −0.410 0.7467 −1.874 1.053 0.302 1 0.583
[stimuli=34.00] −1.615 0.6717 −2.931 −0.298 5.778 1 0.016
[stimuli=36.00] −0.931 0.6474 −2.200 0.338 2.069 1 0.150
(Continued)
Frontiers in Psychology | Perception Science February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 1 | 14
D’Angiulli et al. Image vividness and unexpected recall
Table A6 | Continued
95% Wald confidence interval Hypothesis test
Parameter β SD Lower Upper Wald df P
[stimuli=37.00] 0.881 0.7813 −0.650 2.412 1.272 1 0.259
[stimuli=38.00] −1.978 0.5974 −3.149 −0.807 10.958 1 0.001
[stimuli=39.00] −0.934 0.6869 −2.280 0.412 1.849 1 0.174
[stimuli=40.00] −1.942 0.5491 −3.018 −0.866 12.513 1 0.000
[stimuli=41.00] −0.726 0.5983 −1.898 0.447 1.471 1 0.225
[stimuli=42.00] −0.527 0.7072 −1.913 0.860 0.554 1 0.457
[stimuli=43.00] −2.346 0.6794 −3.678 −1.014 11.922 1 0.001
[stimuli=44.00] −2.760 0.6862 −4.104 −1.415 16.175 1 0.000
[stimuli=45.00] −1.974 0.6386 −3.226 −0.723 9.558 1 0.002
[stimuli=46.00] −1.686 0.6688 −2.997 −0.375 6.355 1 0.012
[stimuli=48.00] −0.120 0.5964 −1.289 1.049 0.041 1 0.840
[stimuli=49.00] −0.994 0.5766 −2.124 0.136 2.971 1 0.085
[stimuli=50.00] 1.164 0.7937 −0.392 2.719 2.150 1 0.143
[stimuli=51.00] 0.488 0.7849 −1.050 2.027 0.387 1 0.534
[stimuli=52.00] −0.759 0.6465 −2.026 0.508 1.379 1 0.240
[stimuli=53.00] −1.054 0.6764 −2.380 0.271 2.430 1 0.119
[stimuli=54.00] −0.415 0.5582 −1.509 0.679 0.553 1 0.457
[stimuli=55.00] −0.753 0.6128 −1.954 0.448 1.509 1 0.219
[stimuli=56.00] −2.425 0.7889 −3.971 −0.879 9.448 1 0.002
[stimuli=57.00] −0.292 0.6341 −1.535 0.950 0.213 1 0.645
[stimuli=58.00] −0.102 0.6570 −1.390 1.185 0.024 1 0.876
[stimuli=59.00] −1.387 0.7481 −2.853 0.079 3.439 1 0.064
[stimuli=60.00] 0a – – – – – 0.015
Dependent variable: recall.
aSet to zero because this parameter is redundant.
Table A7 | Predicted recall value from repeated measure logistic regression model.
Predicted category value
Recalled 0.00 1.00 Total
0.0 (no)
Count 728 144 872
% of Total 50.5 10.0 60.5
1.00 (yes)
Count 252 317 569
% of Total 17.5 22.0 39.5
Total
Count 980 461 1441
% of Total 68.0 32.0 100.0
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APPENDIX B
A corpus of 66 peer-reviewed experimental journal articles repre-
senting 4.32% of the literature available through PsycINFO, and
containing the keyword “vividness” was randomly compiled by a
research assistant naive to the purposes of the study (see Appendix
references). Random selection of a relevant representative sam-
ple can be defended as a sound, reasonable meta-analytic tactic,
provided the selected sources are analyzed according to a set of pre-
defined, a priori criteria (Rosenthal, 1991). As a prerequisite for
inclusivity, any statistical outcome directly pertaining to the mea-
sures VVIQ and trial-by-trial vividness ratings were to be utilized
in the analysis, except those pertaining to post hoc comparisons.
The analysis consisted of two phases, a preliminary non-
parametric analysis, and a secondary parametric analysis. Data for
the preliminary analysis was obtained by partitioning individual
experimental outcomes into two 2× 2 contingency tables. Upon
partitioning each experimental outcome as either a significant or
non-significant experimental outcome, and as either a VVIQ or
trial-by-trial vividness subjective report, each datum was further
categorized as either a neural or behavioral/cognitive objective
measure.
The same dataset from the preliminary non-parametric analy-
sis was utilized in the secondary parametric analysis. However,
each binomial outcome was transformed into an exact probability
value. Analytic accuracy was maintained by calculating proba-
bilities from reported test statistics and degrees of freedom. If
required, raw data was statistically analyzed anew from means
FIGURE A1 | (A) Experimental outcomes for trial-by-trial vividness ratings
and VVIQ with respect to behavioral and/or cognitive measures. (B)
Experimental outcomes for trial-by-trial vividness ratings and VVIQ with
respect to neural measures. The dark line refers to results which reject the
null hypothesis, and the light line refers to results which fail to reject the
null hypothesis.
and variance. This rule was strictly adhered to unless otherwise
unavoidable, in which case probability signifiers were rounded
to the reported cut-off (i.e., p< 0.05 was approximated as 0.05);
however, it should be noted that rounding was required six times
over the course of 863 entries. The resultant entries were then
categorized as either VVIQ or trial-by-trial vividness subjective
report, and as either a neural or behavioral/cognitive objective
measure. All values within each category were summated, and
divided by the square root of the number of entries within each
category.
A non-parametric analysis examining experimental outcome
between VVIQ and trial-by-trial vividness ratings is presented in
Figures A1A,B. The data in Figure A1A represent the number
of significant versus non-significant experimental outcomes for
VVIQ and trial-by-trial vividness ratings for behavioral/cognitive
objective measures. The data in Figure A1B represent the num-
ber of significant versus non-significant experimental outcomes
for VVIQ and trial-by-trial vividness ratings for neural objective
measures. A higher proportion of successes accompany trial-by-
trial vividness ratings for both behavioral/cognitive and neural
objective measures. This relationship is especially true for studies
underlying the neural origin of vividness.
The trends observed in the preliminary analysis prompted the
use of a more sensitive statistical procedure. Because the direction-
ality of each statistical outcome was not immediately apparent,
and degrees of freedom often exceed one for F-tests and Chi-
square tests of significance, standard meta-analytic methodology
was decidedly insufficient for such purposes (Rosenthal, 1991).
Under these circumstances, Stouffer’s method of adding Z ’s pro-
vides a straightforward and reasonable estimate (Mosteller and
Bush, 1954; Rosenthal, 1991). Upon determining exact probabil-
ity values for each entry introduced, the values were transformed
into their standard normal deviates. These values were summated,
and divided by the square root of the number of entries within each
category. Data for the parametric analysis is shown in Figure A2.
These data show the summated Z -scores for VVIQ and trial-by-
trial vividness ratings for behavioral/cognitive and neural objective
measures.
FIGURE A2 | Summed Z -scores for vividness and VVIQ for neural and
behavioral and/or cognitive measures.
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As evidenced by Figure A2, two trends remain especially salient.
Firstly, trial-by-trial vividness ratings are consistently greater
for behavioral/cognitive and neural measures. Secondly, behav-
ioral/cognitive measures yield significantly greater values than
those which are neural. These results suggest that trial-by-trial
vividness ratings are a more effective means by which to mea-
sure the subjective experience of mental imagery. Furthermore,
Fisher’s Z -transformation for experimental outcomes concerning
the correlation between VVIQ scores and trial-by-trial vividness
ratings for 21 entries retrieved from six of the peer-reviewed jour-
nal articles showed an average Zr of 0.154, and variability in these
values ranged from r =−0.27, to r = 0.64. Consistent with the
results of experiment 2, these results support the contention that
trial-by-trial vividness self-reports and VVIQ scores share some
descriptive properties of visual imagery; however, trial-by-trial
vividness ratings seem to be much more resolved.
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